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ENFORCEMENT OF REVENUE LAWS
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
REVENUE LAWS
JOHN L. FREEZE"
Anglo-American judges and textwriters have with such con-
sistency stated that one state will not enforce the revenue or
the penal laws of another that the rule has become familiar
learning.1 The non-inforcement of foreign revenue and penal
laws, for the particular fugitives concerned, constitutes sanc-
tuary between the great mass of enforceable transitory causes
of action on the one side and the extradition and interstate
rendition of criminals on the other.n 2 Whether this judge-
made paradise for those seeking to avoid an obligation to the
state (be it payment of a tax or making restitution for a crimi-
nal offense) is socially desirable and logically sound has in recent
years become an important problem. Evidence of this impor-
tance is the increasing number of attempts by one state or
subdivision thereof to collect taxes from an individual who is
residing in another state,4 and the ease with which offenders
against penal statutes can cross state lines.
A penal law, in the international sense, is one whose purpose
is to mete out punishment in favor of the state, rather than to
redress a private wrong.5 Although penal and revenue laws
are of the same genus in so far as each is a claim existing in
favor of government, yet they are not of the same species, since
the latter are devoid of retributive qualities. It is the purpose
of this paper to examine the extraterritorial enforcement of
revenue laws with respect to (A) original actions- to enforce
such laws in another state, and (B) suits upon tax judgments
brought in the courts of another state.
t The author was awarded the Mary Hitchcock Thesis Prize for 1937
upon his submission of this treatise.
1. The Antelope (1825) 10 Wheat. 123, 6 L. ed. 268. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall said: "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of an-
other." Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1922) 230; Wharton, Conflict of
Laws (3d ed. 1925) 14, 18; Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901) 21; Story, Con-flict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) 840.
2. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims
(1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
3. Ibid.
4. These cases will be discussed in this article.
5. Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. ed.
1123.
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(A) SUIT ON ORIGINAL CAUSE OF ACTION
I. English Cases
In order to appraise the validity of the rule that no state will
enforce the revenue laws of another state, it is necessary to
examine the foundations which were laid in a few early cases,
beginning with Boucher v. Lawson.( There the plaintiff shipped
gold from Portugal to England in a vessel owned by the de-
fendant. The export of gold was prohibited by the laws of the
former country. The master of the vessel refused to deliver the
cargo in London, and the plaintiff brought action against the
owner. One of the defenses was that since it was illegal to ex-
port gold under the laws of Portugal, the parties were par-
ticipes criminis, and the law should not give a remedy. Lord
Hardwick, in denying this defense, said that if it were allowed
it would cut off all benefit of such trade from England, where
such trade was not only lawful but greatly encouraged.
Some forty years later Holman v. Johnso 7 was decided. Plain-
tiff, a resident of Scotland, sold and delivered a quantity of tea
to defendant. Although he knew it was to be smuggled into
England, plaintiff had no concern in the smuggling scheme itself.
To plaintiff's action for the price in England, the defense was
that the contract for the sale of the tea was founded upon an
intention to make illicit use of it, and that therefore plaintiff
was not entitled to the assistance of an English court to recover
the price. Plaintiff was allowed recovery. Since the contract
and the delivery were made in Scotland, plaintiff had plainly
offended no law of England. In a pure dictum Lord Mansfield
took occasion to say, "For no country ever takes notice of the
revenue laws of another."s
Shortly afterward Lord Mansfield decided Planche v. Fletcher0
Plaintiffs, London merchants, insured goods in a vessel sailing
from London for France. The ship was, however, cleared for
Ostend, Belgium. Because of war between France and England
the cargo was captured. Plaintiffs sued the underwriter on the
policy. The defense was fraud on defendant in clearing the ship
for Ostend when she was never intended to go there. The court
6. (1734) Cases temp. Hardwiche 85, 89, 198, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55, 127.
7. (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120.
8. Id. at p. 343.
9. (1779) 1 Doug. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164.
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held with plaintiff on the ground that this false clearance was
proved to be the constant course of the trade and well known
to everyone connected therewith. Lord Mansfield, having de-
cided this, then went on to say that it did not appear why it
was the custom to clear for Ostend, but that possibly duties were
lower there. In any event the motive did not matter, he said, be-
cause "one nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of
another."1° This of course was obiter dictum and not necessary
to the decision.
Another ancestor of the rule against non-enforceability was
Sharp v. Taylor.11 There two British subjects purchased an
American-built ship on a joint speculation for the purpose of
employing her in trade between the two countries until they
could resell her to advantage. With this in view, they procured
her to be registered in the name of C, a citizen of the United
States, upon the false declaration that she was bona& fide the
property of C. After the ship had made several voyages English-
man B, who had the management of the ship, refused to share
the profits with Englishman A. The latter brought suit, to which
B interposed the defense that since the false registration was a
fraud upon the American law, no action could be maintained.
The court disposed of the defense by saying that the courts of
England will not refuse to decide the rights of joint importers
simply because in the production or exportation of the particular
commodity some fiscal law of a foreign country has been vio-
lated.12
The common element in these early cases is the apprehension
of the judges that "to take notice" of the foreign revenue law
would have hampered international trade. This sentiment was
well expressed in The Emperor of Austria v. Day-3 where the
court said
Although from the comity of nations, the rule has been to
pay respect to the laws of foreign countries, yet for the
10. Id. at p. 253.
11. (1848) 2 Phil]. 801, 41 Eng. Rep. 1153.
12. See 2 Phill. at 816, where the court said: "During the French war
the greater part of the foreign trade of this country was carried on in
despite of the fiscal regulations of other countries, some of which were
not at war with this country; and there are still instances existing of the
same kind; but the parties to such transactions have not, upon that ground,
been denied the ordinary administration of justice in matters growing out
of such transactions."
13. (1861) 3 De. G. F. and J. 216, 45 Eng. Rep. 861.
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general benefit of free trade, "revenue laws" have always
been the exception; and this may be an example of an ex-
ception proving the rule.14
Although the non-enforceability of revenue laws was thus evolved
from a desire to promote commercial conveniences, it came to be
applied in a type of case where no such interest could possibly
be promoted by its application.
Such a case was Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull. , The
legislature of New South Wales passed an act authorizing the
Municipal Council of Sydney to improve a certain street in that
city, and imposed upon the property owners within the improve-
ment area the burden of contributing toward the cost. The coun-
cil was empowered to distrain the goods of these owners, and
in addition to recover by personal action the amounts due and
payable.1 6 When distraint did not yield the amount of contribu-
tion assessed against a certain owner within the area, the coun-
cil brought action in England against Bull, who had covenanted
with the owner to save him harmless against the claim in this
action. It was held for defendant. The court said
the action is in the nature of an action for a penality
or to recover a tax; it is analogous to an action brought in
one country to enforce the revenue laws of another. In such
cases it has always been held that an action will not lie out-
side the confines of the last-mentioned state.
This language is interesting, particularly the use of the word
"always," because the Bull case represents one of the first at-
tempts of one government to recover a tax by means of action
in the courts of another. Moreover, no authority is cited for this
sweeping condemnation of foreign revenue laws.
What then did the court have in mind? There was no com-
mercial convenience to promote in this case. In answer to plain-
tiff's contention that the action was in nature transitory, the
court said: "I do not think it is. Some limit must be placed upon
the available means of enforcing the sumptuary laws enacted by
14. Id. at p. 242.
15. (1909) 1 K. B. 7.
16. The power to create personal liability for local improvements does
not prevail everywhere. Many American jurisdictions limit the assessment
to a charge upon the land. Such is the rule in Missouri. See St. Louis v.
Allen (1873) 53 Mo. 44, 35 L. R. A. 58; Comment (1909) 22 Harv. L. Rev.
292.
17. (1909) 1 K. B. 7, 12 (Italics supplied).
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foreign States for their own municipal purposes."'1 8 The tone of
the opinion impels the conclusion that the court felt there was
something penal about a foreign tax law. In some manner the
judicial spark jumped the gap from refusal to recognize foreign
revenue laws in the interest of commercial convenience where
the suit was between private parties to the proposition that one
state cannot maintain an action to enforce its revenue laws in
the courts of another.19
The next effort at extraterritorial collection of taxes in En-
gland arose in H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker.20 One
Visser had died domiciled in Holland, leaving personalty in
England. The Dutch sovereign brought an action in England
under the Succession Act, a Dutch statute, claiming that the
succession duty on the estate constituted a debt owing to her.
In dismissing the action the court followed the Bull case. Plain-
tiff's counsel attempted to distinguish that case on the ground
that there a municipal corporation was suing, but that here an
independent sovereign was suing. It seems that there is valid-
ity in this attempted distinction. In the former case the Moore
Street Improvement Act, which formed the basis of the action,
did not authorize the municipal corporation to bring suit in the
courts of a foreign country. The sole object of the legislation
appeared to be "to provide that within that area where the claim
was recoverable it might be recovered by an action."' 21 But in
the Drukker case the Dutch sovereign brought the action, and
there is no doubt as to her power to sue in a foreign forum,
provided it is the kind of case which the court will hear.
The brief of counsel for plaintiff also argued vigorously that
there was no actual decision in England for the proposition that
one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another, but that
such statements were obiter dicta. The rather naive reply in
the opinion was that "the absence of authority may indicate
that the proposition is not well founded in principle, but it may
also merely indicate that it is so well recognized that it has
never been put to the test."2 - Counsel further urged that the
18. Ibid.
19. A second basis for the decision in the Bull case was that an action
to recover a charge on the land by enforcing a personal liability is a mixed
action, and that a mixed action, like a real action, should be determined in
the forum rei sitae.
20. (1928) 1 Ch. 877.
21. Municipal Council v. Bull (1909) 1 K. B. 7, 12.
22. H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker (1928) 1 Ch. 877, 882.
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older cases were decided on the principle that if the revenue
laws of another country were recognized it would interfere with
freedom of trade to the detriment of England. Note how that
argument was met:
My own opinion is that there is a well recognized rule,
which has been enforced for at least two hundred years or
thereabouts, under which these Courts will not collect the
taxes of foreign States; and this is one of those actions
which these courts will not entertain. 23
There seems little doubt that the court simply turned a deaf ear
to reason and paid obeisance to what it thought the rule of law
to be. Nevertheless, the Druikker case crystallizes in England
the rule that one country will not enforce the revenue laws of
another, anomalous though its development has been.
II. American Cases
In view of the English heritage possessed by our early Ameri-
can courts, it is not surprising to find foreign revenue laws re-
ceiving treatment here similar to that accorded them in the
mother country. Probably the earliest American case in point
is Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer.24 That was a suit upon a promis-
sory note executed by defendant in France, made payable in New
York. Under the law of France the note was void there unless
it was stamped in accordance with the revenue laws of that
country. The note in question was not stamped, and defendant
contended that since it was void there, no recovery should be
allowed on it in New York. It was held to be immaterial whether
or not the note was stamped according to French law, on the
ground that New York courts do not sit to enforce the revenue
laws of other countries. The court added that even if they had
to notice the French revenue law, it could well be said that the
parties never contemplated payment there, and this would "form
a sufficient excuse" for not following French law. Since the note
was valid by the law of the place of performance, the correct
result was reached here. There is no indication that the New
York court was influenced by the policy favoring freedom of
trade found in the English cases; the doctrine of non-enforce-
23. Id. at p. 884.
24. (N. Y. 1806) 1 Johns. 93; cf. Indian and General Investment Trust
v. Borax Consolidated (1920) 1 K. B. 539; Beadall v. Moore (1922) 199
App. Div. 531, 191 N. Y. S. 826.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/2
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ability was simply accepted without any supporting reasoning
whatever.
So also in Henry v. Sargeant,25 a leading American case, was
the dictum repeated. That was an action in New Hampshire for
damages resulting from the imprisonment of plaintiff in Ver-
mont until he paid a tax assessed by a town in that state. The
New Hampshire court took jurisdiction on the ground that this
was an ordinary transitory cause of action. In dismissing the
defense that the courts of one state will not notice the revenue
laws of another state for the purpose of reviewing proceedings
had under them, the court said
There is no attempt to enforce the penal or revenue laws
of Vermont by this action. If there were, it would be held
that this was not to be done through the instrunfentality of
the courts of another state; as, for instance, if the attempt
was to collect a tax assessed in Vermont by suit here.26
No reasons nor authority were given for this statement.
The first time an American court was actually called upon to
collect a tax for a sister state was in J. A. Holshauser Co. v.
Gold Hill Copper Co. 27 A New Jersey statute provided that every
corporation chartered by that state should pay an annual fran-
chise tax of a certain percentage of its capital stock. The statute
further provided that such tax should be a debt due the state
for which an action at law could be maintained after the same
had been in arrears one month, and that such tax should be a
preferred debt in case of insolvency. The Copper Company, a
New Jersey corporation, owed the state $12,000 for three years'
back franchise taxes. When creditors of the company brought
proceedings in North Carolina to have a receiver appointed, the
State of New Jersey presented the back tax claim. The decision
of the trial court, that New Jersey was entitled to file its claim,
but that it was entitled to no preference, was affirmed on appeal.
New Jersey was allowed to come in as a creditor, but the statu-
tory provision as to preference was held to have no extraterri-
torial force on the ground that it would prejudice local creditors.
It has been suggested that the court simply overlooked the fact
that it was helping another state to collect her taxes. 28 Whatever
25. (1843) 13 N. H. 321.
26. Id. at p. 332 (Italics mine).
27. (1905) 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650.
28. Comment (1936) 4 George Washington L. Rev. 281.
19381
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the explanation of the result here, the case has never been fol-
lowed, and it is the lone instance of recovery by one state, on a
tax claim not reduced to judgment, in the courts of another state.
A dissimilar result was reached in Maryland v. Turner.2' There
two actions were brought, one by the State of Maryland and
one by the mayor of the City of Baltimore, against defendant
to recover from him a sum of money equal to the amount of
taxes assessed against him upon personal property while he was
a resident of that state and city. A demurrer for failure to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was sustained.
Plaintiffs had contended that the highest courts of Maryland,
in interpreting its tax laws, had held that by the assessment of
a tax a legal duty and obligation was created under and by which
defendant impliedly agreed to pay said tax; that in effect it was
a contractual obligation. But the court decided that whether a
foreign tax was a penal law or a contractual obligation is to
be determined by the law of the forum. Since by the law of New
York the imposition of a tax raised not a contractual liability,
but rather an impost operating in invitum, it was held that plain-
tiffs could not maintain the action. By the generally accepted
rule of the conflict of laws, matters connected with the substan-
tive part of a transaction are determined by the law of the forum
where the transaction arose, while matters of procedure are de-
termined by the law of the forum where suit is brought. 0 Apply-
ing this rule to the Turner case, it would seem that the New York
court should have applied the Maryland doctrine, namely, that
such a tax was a contractual liability. Having taken this position,
the court would then decide the controversy as in the case of any
other foreign contract action.
It is implicit in the opinion in the Turner case that the foreign
taxes were of a penal nature in the New York court, even though
they were considered contractual in Maryland. It was stated at
the outset that the extraterritorial enforcement of foreign reve-
nue laws was severable from that of the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of penal laws. For purposes of convenience this is true,
since there is a great mass of case law on the subject of penal
laws. Nevertheless, this classification has not always been clearly
made in the cases, as is witnessed by the Turner case. It has
29. (1911) 75 Misc. Rep. 9, 132 N. Y. S. 173.
30. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927) 228.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/2
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been demonstrated that the non-enforceability of foreign revenue
laws resulted from a desire to foster trade. The non-enforce-
ability of penal laws was based upon a similar provinciality-
the notion that one sovereign would not recognize a claim run-
ning in favor of another. Witness the test of penality laid down
in the famous case of Huntington v. Attrill31 :
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some
aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the interna-
tional sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of
another State, depends upon the question whether its pur-
pose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the
State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by
the wrongful act.
If it is the former the law is penal; if the latter, it is not. There-
fore since a tax obligation does run in favor of the state and
not of an individual, it is not strange that the concept of penality
has crept into the tax cases. So Professor Beale has said, with
respect to the dicta in the early freedom of trade cases, that
"the courts have repeated the rule [against non-enforcement of
foreign revenue laws] without careful consideration and merely
as a literary corollary to the proposition that no state will en-
force the penal laws of another state." 32
The case which is probably most cited for the rule that one
state will not enforce the revenue laws of another is Colorado v.
HarbeckA3 There the State of Colorado brought an action to
recover an inheritance or transfer tax upon the estate of Har-
beck. The latter was a resident of Colorado who died in New
York. His will was admitted to probate in New York, and letters
testamentary were issued to his widow. The estate consisted of
$3,000,000 worth of stocks and bonds, none of which were present
in Colorado at decedent's death nor thereafter. The decision that
the New York court would not take jurisdiction was placed upon
two grounds. Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, where delinquent taxpayers are non-residents of
the taxing state and outside the jurisdiction, no personal lia-
bility may be established against them; and where the property
is without the taxing state, and no res exists upon which the
31. (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 673, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. ed. 1123.
32. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 1638.
33. 179 N. Y. S., reversed (1921) 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357.
1938]
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taxing state may impose a lien, the state cannot collect the tax
in its own courts nor in those of a sister state.34 It would seem
that since there was no jurisdiction to levy a valid tax in Colo-
rado, the decision might have been placed upon this ground
alone. Nevertheless the court went on to say
* * * the attempt to give such a statutory provision extra-
territorial effect would conflict with another well settled
principle of private international law which precludes one
state from acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state
and from enforcing its penal or revenue laws as such. The
rule is universally recognized that the revenue laws of one
state have no force in another.3 5
The rule in Colorado v. Harbeck, whether or not it was neces-
sary to the decision, represents the attitude which New York
takes toward the enforcement of foreign revenue laws. Although
nearly all of the cognate cases have been decided in that state, it
is probable that the rule would be followed in other states should
the problem arise.
III. The Federal Courts
The position of the Federal Courts on the enforcement of the
revenue laws of states other than the one in which they are
sitting is not so clear cut as that of the state courts. In New
York Trust Co. v. Island Oil and Transport Corp. ° creditors of
the latter company, a Virginia corporation, brought suit in the
34. Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It? (1935)
48 Harv. L. Rev. 407.
35. Colorado v. Harbeck (1921) 232 N. Y. 71, 85, 133 N. E. 357. Ac-
cord: In re Bliss' Estate (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 773, 202 N. Y. S. 185.(Application by Vermont tax commissioner to New York Surrogate Court
for payment of Vermont inheritance tax dismissed on ground that Vermont
had no jurisdiction to levy a valid tax, and that New York should not be
the tax collector for its sister states) ; but cf. In re Hollins (1913) 79 Misc.
Rep. 220, 139 N. Y. S. 713. (It was held that American executors of an
English testatrix were justified in remitting to the English executors a
sum sufficient to discharge the legacy duty imposed by the laws of England
on the annuity to a legatee resident in Austria. The court strove to reach
a fair result and said, 1. c. 717: "While it is doubtless true that this court
will not aid a foreign country in the enforcement of its revenue laws, it
will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of that part
of an estate within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would
result in the enforcement of such revenue laws." In re Martin's Will (1931)
255 N. Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753, expressly leaves open the question whether
the return of assets of a decedent's estate to the state of domicile for the
purpose of allowing the latter to levy a tax is the enforcement of a foreign
revenue law within the rule of Colorado v. Harbeck.
36. (C. C. A. 2, 1926) 11 F. (2d) 698.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/2
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District Court for the Southern District of New York, and a
receiver was appointed. The State of Virginia sought to recover
an annual franchise tax placed upon all corporations created by
it. Counsel for Virginia appeared by permission of court, and
the receivers petitioned the court for instructions whether to pay
the tax. The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District
Court, held that there was no legal duty to pay the tax, and that
it would be inexpedient to pay as a matter of comity since the
money equitably belonged to the creditors. The opinion indicates
that had this been a receivership in a federal court in Virginia,
with assets in that state, a preferential payment of the tax would
have been due, had the Virginia law so held.87 But it is further
stated that had Virginia appeared and demanded payment in the
District Court in New York (Virginia was not a party to this
suit, and counsel appeared by permission), it could not have been
recovered on the ground that "neither its sovereignty nor its
statutes has any extraterritorial vigor."3 8 Although this lan-
guage is obiter, this court would probably follow the rule as laid
down in Colorado v. Har beck.
There is, however, no authoritative decision by the United
States Supreme Court as to the position which the lower federal
courts must take when they are confronted with the problem
under consideration, and that the question is still open is evinced
by the case of Moore v. Mitchell. 9 That was a suit by the trea-
surer of Grant County, Indiana, to recover taxes which arose
while decedent was resident there, brought against his executors
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The suit was dismissed in the District Court on the ground that
this kind of claim will not be enforced in the New York courts
under the decision in Colorado v. Harbeck, and that therefore
if the executors paid the tax, the payment might not be allowed
in the state court which appointed them. A companion ground
for dismissal was that since decedent was not in the state at the
time the tax accrued and since he had no property there, the
State of Indiana had no jurisdiction to impose the tax. The Cir-
37. See Marshall v. New York (1920) 254 U. S. 380, 385, 41 S. Ct. 143,
66 L. ed. 315.
38. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1926) 11 F.(2d) 698, 699.
39. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 997; (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 30 F.
(2d) 600; (1930) 281 U. S. 18, 50 S. Ct. 175, 74 L. ed. 673.
19383
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cuit Court of Appeals adopted the latter ground as the basis for
their decision, and affirmed the judgment below.
Judge Learned Hand, in a concurring opinion in the Circuit
Court of Appeals, took the position that a valid tax was levied,
imposing a personal liability upon decedent, because he was liv-
ing at the time of the assessment, and the fact that the securi-
ties were out of the jurisdiction did not affect its validity.40
Therefore he was squarely presented with the issue whether a
lawfully imposed tax of a foreign state can be collected by suit
in a federal court sitting in another state. He decided that the
court should not enforce the tax on the ground that it might be
embarrassing for one state to pass upon a matter involving the
relation of a sister state to its citizen. That is, he said, the forum
will ordinarily determine whether a foreign cause of action is
contra to the public policy of the forum, but when this inquiry
concerns the provisions of public order of another state, the
forum might find itself embarrassed in holding the action to be
against its own public policy; therefore it is best not to take
jurisdiction at all. This theory Judge Hand admittedly made out
of whole cloth.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal, expressly
refused to decide whether a federal court in one state will enforce
the revenue laws of another state. Rather the decision was placed
upon a ground different from any of those in the courts below,
namely, that the tax collector had no capacity to sue outside the
State of Indiana.41 He was, it was said, an arm of the state,
with no better standing to sue outside of Indiana than an Indiana
executor or chancery receiver, and the Federal Courts have al-
ways declined to take jurisdiction of suits by such persons ap-
pointed in another state. The Supreme Court has yet to decide,
therefore, whether a suit by a party with capacity to sue, a state
for example, for the purpose of enforcing its revenue law, will be
entertained by a federal court sitting in a different state. At
present the dictum in the Island Oil case42 and the concurring
opinion of Judge Hand in Moore v. Mitcel 43 indicate that under
such circumstances a federal court will decline jurisdiction.
40. (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 600.
41. (1930) 281 U. S. 18, 50 S. Ct. 175, 74 L. ed. 673.
42. Supra, note 38.
43. Supra, note 40.
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IV. Remedies
In order to meet the problem of tax evasion which the courts
have left unsolved the legislatures in a number of states have
adopted reciprocal legislation with a view to the collection of
domiciliary death taxes. These statutes provide in substance
that where there is an administration of a nonresident estate
in the foreign state the legal representative will reserve and
transmit to the domiciliary state a sufficient amount of the
estate funds to cover domiciliary taxes, providing the laws
of the domiciliary state afford like protection in the collec-
tion of such taxes."
This solution can only partially ameliorate the difficulty, how-
ever, since it applies only to death taxes.
If the historical reason for the non-enforcement of foreign
revenue laws, namely, the desire to foster free trade, has no
validity in our federal system, and it is patent that it has none,
it is necessary to see what reasons there are, if any, for such
non-enforcement.
First, there is the question of public policy. The forum may
refuse to grant relief because it disapproves of the foreign cause
of action.45 But surely in our federal system it is not likely that
the public policy of one state would be offended by the taxes of
another.46 The application of the defense of public policy should
be limited. Professor Beale has said
This is especially true as between the states of the United
States, for not only is there little or no variation in the
fundamental policies of their respective laws, but here, even
more than elsewhere, a uniform enforcement of right is
greatly desirable.47
Therefore the argument that the forum might be embarrassed
in dealing with the relations between a sister state and its citizen
-the contention of Judge Hand in Moore v. Mitchell--does not
particularly commend itself. It would seem that greater em-
barrassment and bad feeling would arise from the complete re-
fusal to take jurisdiction.
44. Kidder, State Inheritance Taxation and Taxability of Trusts (1934)
308.
45. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1917) 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147,
62 L. ed. 368.
46. Cf. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co. (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 56
S. Ct. 229, 80 L. ed. 220.
47. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 1651.
1938]
Washington University Open Scholarship
334 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
Secondly, there is the fear expressed in Colorado v. Harbeck
that one state would be acting as the tax collector for another.
Nearly all of the attempts at extrastate collection of taxes have
been made in the state and federal courts of New York. It is
conceded that if New York were to allow other states to collect
their taxes in its courts the latter might be burdened, although
the provision for reciprocal remission of estate funds to cover
domiciliary death taxes would alleviate such a condition to a
degree.48 This difficulty presumably would affect only the State
of New York, and it may be discounted so far as the other juris-
dictions are concerned.
The third conceivable objection, perhaps rather tenuous, to the
uniform extrastate enforcement of revenue laws is that the ab-
sence of a fair remedy in the forum might make it inconvenient
for the forum to enforce the taxes of a sister state. If, for ex-
ample, the tax was such that the forum would experience great
difficulty in administering it, it might be desirable to decline
jurisdiction.49
In some cases taxes have been regarded as contractual in na-
ture. Such was the holding in People of New York v. Coe Manu-
facturing Co., 0 where the consent of a corporation to pay a
franchise tax was implied. If the liability is thus bottomed upon
contract, it would seem that the forum could not object to giving
a remedy upon the contract. But in most taxes it is difficult to
spell out the consent since they generally operate in invitum.
Moreover, in Maryland v. Turner5' a New York court refused to
enforce a Maryland tax even though Maryland considered the tax
contractual. It seems that whether the liability is consensual or
not is irrelevant, and that the logical solution to the problem is to
annex suits for taxes to the great body of enforceable transitory
causes of action.52
48. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims
(1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 221.
49. Cf. Slater v. Mexican National Ry. Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 24
S. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 900. (Suit in district court in Texas against Colorado
corporation for damages under Mexican wrongful death statute dismissed.
The court could not effectuate the remedy provided by the Mexican statute,
namely, periodic payments to surviving wife and children until former re-
married or latter came of age). See also Marshall v. Sherman (1895) 148
N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419. (Refusal to take jurisdiction apparently placed upon
ground that the court could not give a fair remedy).
50. (1934) 112 N. J. L. 536, 172 Atl. 198.
51. (1911) 75 Misc. Rep. 9, 132 N. Y. S. 173.
52. Supra, note 48.
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(B) SUIT ON TAX JUDGMENT
It has been seen so far that the courts have almost universally
held that a state cannot bring an original cause of action for
taxes in the courts of another state. Suppose, however, that State
A, having acquired jurisdiction over taxpayer C, brings suit
against him in one of its own courts and recovers judgment.
Before execution taxpayer C removes his person and property to
State B. Can State A enforce its judgment in the courts of State
B? Does the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal Consti-
tution make such enforcement mandatory? What effect has the
merger of the tax into judgment upon the extrastate enforcement
of the former? These problems remain for consideration.
Article IV, section 1, of the Federal Constitution provides that
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof."'5 This clause has been much litigated, but the net result
has been "to leave extrastate protection of rights, except such as
have ripened into a definite judicial judgment, exactly where the
Constitution found it, that is to say on a basis of comity, and
so at the mercy of the adverse local policy of the forum state."54
The present status of a judgment of another state is that it is
conclusive evidence of the proceedings in the sister state, and
suit must be brought upon such judgment by an action of debt.5
There are, however, certain limitations even upon the enforce-
ment of judgments under the "full faith and credit" clause-
situations in which a judgment is not conclusive. Among these
is want of jurisdiction. It is clear that unless a court has juris-
diction over the defendant, any judgment which it may render
53. In pursuance thereof Congress passed Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11,
1 Stat. 122, and Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, sec. 2, 2 Stat. 299, which
are today Revised Statutes, secs. 905-906, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. secs. 687-
688. Section 905 provides for the authentication of the legislative acts of
states and territories and of their records and judicial proceedings. It
further provides that "the said records and judicial proceedings authenti-
cated as aforesaid shall be given such faith and credit in every court of
the United States as they have by the law and usage in the courts of the
state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Section 906
makes similar provision for records "not appertaining to a court."
54. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 371 (Italics mine).
55. McElmoyle v. Cohen (1839) 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. ed. 177.
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is void under the Fourteenth Amendment, not only in the state
where rendered,56 but also in any other state. And courts of
other states are not required to give such a judgment full faith
and credit.' 8 Jurisdiction then may be defined as that function
which a state exercises "through its courts over a person by
creating through the judgment or decree of its courts, rights
against the person which under the principles of the common law
will be recognized as valid in other states." 9
Assuming then that a judgment is based upon proper juris-
diction, are there other factors which may prevent it from re-
ceiving full faith and credit? It is settled that even though a
judgment violates the public policy of the forum, it must never-
theless be accorded recognition.0 Moreover, a judgment based
upon an error of law, if conclusive in the state where rendered,
must be given equal effect in other states.6 1 But a judgment pro-
cured by fraud is not entitled to full faith and credit if the fraud
could be attacked in equity in the forum where the judgment was
rendered.2 Neither is a judgment based upon a penal claim
entitled to full faith and credit. That was decided in Wisconsin
v. Pelican Insurance Co.63
In that case the state brought an original action of debt in the
56. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 326.
57. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Thompson v.
Whitman (1873) 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897.
58. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 326.
59. Omitted.
60. Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. ed.1039 (Missouri judgment given full faith and credit in Mississippi although
the judgment was based upon a futures contract which was by statute
unenforceable in Mississippi), Kenney v. Supreme Lodge (1920) 252 U. S.
411, 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. ed. 638; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit"
Clause (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 371, 377-378.
61. Roche v. McDonald (1927) 275 U. S. 449, 48 S. Ct. 142, 72 L. ed.365. (Plaintiff recovered judgment in Washington and sued on the judg-
ment in Oregon. The Oregon court awarded a judgment against defendant,
more than six years after rendition of the Washington judgment. Plain-
tiff then brought suit on the Oregon judgment in Washington. In the last
suit the defense was that under a Washington statute a judgment expired
after six years and no suit should be had extending its duration. Held,
that although the Oregon court made an error of law in allowing suit on
the judgment, nevertheless it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter, and its judgment was entitled to full faith and credit).
62. Levin v. Gladstein (1906) 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E. 371, 32 L. R. A.(N. S.) 905. (To suit in North Carolina on a Maryland judgment, the de-
fense was fraud in the procurement. Since the judgment could have been
attacked in equity in Maryland, a similar defense was good in North Caro-
lina); cf. Christmas v. Russell (1866) 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. ed. 475.
63. (1887) 127 U. S. 265, 8 S. Ct. 1370, 32 L. ed. 239.
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Supreme Court of the United States against a Louisiana cor-
poration upon a judgment recovered by Wisconsin in one of its
own courts. A Wisconsin statute provided that each fire insur-
ance company doing business in the state should file an annual
financial statement with the commissioner of insurance, provid-
ing monetary penalties for failure to do so. The defendant de-
murred on the ground that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction of a suit between a state and citizens of another
state only where the controversy is of a civil nature, and not
where it is sought to enforce a penal law. The language of the
Court in sustaining the demurrer was quite broad
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences
for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the
State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any viola-
tion of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other
municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties. If
this were not so, all that would be necessary to give ubiqui-
tous effect to a penal law would be to put the claim for a
penalty into the shape of a judgment.6 4
Although the Pelican case only decides that a judgment based
upon a penal law is not entitled to full faith and credit, it was
thought until recently that the dictum just quoted, that judg-
ments based upon revenue laws are also not entitled to full faith
and credit, could fairly be stated as the rule in such cases.65
The result in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co. 66 was there-
fore not easily predicted. Milwaukee County, a citizen of Wis-
consin, brought suit in the District Court for Northern Illinois
against defendant corporation, a citizen of Illinois, to recover
on a judgment for income taxes duly recovered in a Wisconsin
state court. The District Court dismissed the cause as a suit in
substance to enforce the revenue laws of Wisconsin. The question
whether a United States District Court in Illinois should enter-
tain an action on a judgment predicated upon an income tax due
from defendant to the State of Wisconsin was certified to the
64. See 127 U. S. at 290 (Italics mine).
65. Restatement, Conflicts (1934) sec. 443: "A valid foreign judgment
for the payment of money which has been obtained in favor of a state, a
state agency, or a private person, on a cause of action created by the law
of the foreign state as a method of furthering its own governmental inter-
ests will not be enforced."
66. (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 56 S. Ct. 229, 80 L. ed. 220.
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Supreme Court. The question was answered in the affirmative.' 7
A judgment ordering the payment of money, it was said, is in the
nature of a debt, regardless of the nature of the right which gave
rise to the judgment.
In considering the implications of this opinion it should be
noted first that the case need not have decided that the Wisconsin
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, but rather the
decision could have been rested upon comity. A federal court
sitting in a state "is bound equally with courts of the State to
observe the command of the full faith and credit clause, where
applicable," 68 but since no previous Illinois decision had given
full faith and credit to extrastate tax judgments, the Illinois Dis-
trict Court was not bound to do so in this case.69 Nevertheless,
the language of the opinion is such that it is tantamount to a
decision that the court was bound to give full faith and credit
to the Wisconsin judgment.70
It is also of moment that this case removes the last vestige
of penality from revenue laws. Under the rule in Wisconsin v.
Pelican Insurance Co.71 a judgment based upon a penal law is not
entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore the decision in the
Milwaukee County case that a judgment based upon a revenue
law will be enforced in another state a fortiori removes revenue
laws from the realm of penality.
Finally, not the least significant point in the case is the state-
ment that the Court would not commit itself on the question it
left open in Moore v. Mitchell7 2 namely, whether a court in one
state must take jurisdiction of an original suit for taxes brought
in one of its courts by another state.
(C) CONCLUSION
In recapitulation of the treatment which the courts have ac-
corded extrastate revenue laws, the following conclusions are
probably the most significant:
(1) Historically foreign revenue laws were not enforced be-
cause of the desire to foster trade.
67. Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler answered "No."
68. Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 155, 52
S. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed. 1026.
69. Comment (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 490.
70. Cf. Comment (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 526.
71. (1887) 127 U. S. 265, 8 S. Ct. 1370, 32 L. ed. 239.
72. (1930) 281 U. S. 18, 50 S. Ct. 175, 74 L. ed. 673.
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(2) Although the reason for this policy has no validity where
the suit is to collect a tax, particularly in our federal system,
both state and federal courts have clung to this anachronistic
rule.
(3) Subject to the qualifications that a fair remedy might
be lacking in the forum and the possibility that the New York
courts might be overburdened, the extrastate collection of taxes
by original cause of action should be allowed.
(4) Whether such enforcement may at some time be required
was expressly left undecided in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co.,7 3 although almost uniformly the courts have so far refused it.
(5) When a revenue law has been reduced to judgment it may
be enforced in another state on the principle of comity. Such a
judgment, under the broad language of the Milwaukee County
case, may possibly be entitled to full faith and credit. That case
may well be said to offer new hope to the apostles of uniform
vested rights.
73. (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 56 S. Ct. 229, 80 L. ed. 220.
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